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Towards a Computational Analysis of Probabilistic 
Argumentation Frameworks 
PIERPAOLO DONDIO1 
1
 School of Computing,  
Dublin Institute of Technology, Kevin Street 2, Dublin, Ireland 
 
In this paper we analyze probabilistic argumentation frameworks (PAFs), 
defined as an extension of Dung abstract argumentation frameworks in which 
each argument  is asserted with a probability . The debate around PAFs 
has so far centered on their theoretical definition and basic properties. This 
work contributes to their computational analysis by proposing a first recursive 
algorithm to compute the probability of acceptance of each argument under 
grounded and preferred semantics, and by studying the behavior of PAFs with 
respect to reinstatement, cycles and changes in argument structure. The 
computational tools proposed may provide strategic information for agents 
selecting the next step in an open argumentation process and they represent a 
contribution in the debate about gradualism in abstract argumentation. 
 
KEYWORDS: Argumentation Theory, Probabilistic Reasoning, Abstract 
Argumentation, Grounded and Preferred Semantics  
INTRODUCTION 
An abstract argumentation framework is a direct graph where nodes represent arguments and 
arrows represent the attack relation. Abstract argumentation frameworks [13, 9] were 
introduced by Dung [2] to analyze properties of defeasible arguments, i.e. arguments whose 
validity can be disputed by other conflicting arguments.  
 Various semantics have been defined to identify the set of acceptable arguments. In this 
work we deal with grounded and preferred semantics and we follow the labeling approach 
proposed by Caminada [7], where a semantics assigns to each argument a label in, out or 
undec, meaning that the argument is considered consistently acceptable, non-acceptable or 
undecided (i.e. one abstains from an opinion).  
 In Dung’s original work, arguments are treated as abstract entities that are either fully 
asserted or not asserted at all, and there are no degrees related to either arguments or relations 
of attacks. Abstract argumentation is often too strict and coarse to support a decision making 
process. The situation is described by Dunne et al. [11], who notice how the solution provided 
by abstract argumentation “is often an empty set or several sets with nothing to distinguish 
between them”. Abstract argumentation has proven to be efficient in keeping the logical 
consistency of conflicting evidence, but there are limited extensions that can be practically 
deployed to handle gradualism. Some approaches have tried to marry probability calculus and 
argumentation semantics, defining probabilistic argumentation frameworks. In a  an 
  
argumentation semantics is used to identify under which conditions a set of arguments are 
acceptable, while probability calculus quantifies how likely those conditions are. 
 The study of PAFs is still at an embryonic stage. Debate has centered on their correct 
theoretical definition and some basic properties derived from abstract argumentation. There is 
no computational algorithm proposed beside the brute force approach, and no study over their 
behavior w.r.t. to reinstatement or sensitivity to changes in the argumentation structure. 
 Taking stock of previous research in the area, we first modify some formal definitions 
of  concepts. However, these definitions are anchored in previous works and do not 
represent the major contribution of the paper. Our key contribution is represented by a set of 
new computational tools developed for analyzing : we describe the first recursive 
algorithm to compute the probability of acceptance of each argument and we study the 
behavior of  w.r.t. to reinstatement, cycles and changes in the arguments structure. Our 
work represents a contribution to the introduction of gradualism in argumentation.  
 The paper is organized as follows: in the first two sections we recall the pre-requisites 
of abstract argumentation and PAFs; we describe the very first algorithm to compute the 
acceptance probabilities of the arguments. We then describe the behavior of  w.r.t. to 
reinstatement and cycles, we analyze the behavior of  in relation to changes and we 
propose an application of , before discussing related works. 
BACKGROUND DEFINITIONS 
Definition 1. (Abstract Argumentation Framework) Let  be the universe of all possible 
arguments. An argumentation framework is a pair (
	, 	) where 
 is a finite subset of  
and 	 ⊆ 	
	 × 	
 is the attack relation.  
 Let us consider AF = (Ar	, R	) and	Args ⊆ Ar. 
Definition 2. (conflict-free). 
 is conflict-free iff ∄, 	 ∈ 
	|			 
Definition 3. (defense). 
 defends an argument 	 ⊆ 	
 iff 
∀		
	 !ℎ	#ℎ#				, ∃	!		
	 !ℎ	#ℎ#	!		. The set of arguments defended by 

 is denoted (
). 
Definition 4. (indirect attack/defense) Let , 	 ∈ 	r and the graph % defined by (
	, 	). 
Then (1)  indirectly attacks  if there is an odd-length path from  to  in the attack graph % 
and (2)  indirectly defends  if there is an even-length path from  to  in %. 
 Two arguments  and  are rebuttals iff (, ) ∧ (, ). 
 Labeling. A semantics identifies a set of arguments that can survive the conflicts 
encoded by the attack relation . In this work we follow the labeling approach of Caminada et 
al. [7], where a semantics assigns to each argument a label in, out or undec.  
Definition 5. (labeling/conflict free). Let  = (
	, 	) be an argumentation framework. A 
labeling is a total function ' ∶ 	
	 → 	 {+, , #,  -.!}. We write in(L) for {	
|'() = +}, 
out(L) for {	
|'() = , #}, and undec(L) for {	
|'() =  -.!}. A labeling is 
conflict-free if no in-labeled argument attacks an in-labeled argument. 
Definition 6. (complete labeling, from Definition 5 in [7]). Let (
	, 	) be an 
argumentation framework. A complete labeling is a labeling that for every 		
 holds that:1. 
if  is labeled + then all attackers of  are labeled , #; 2. if all attackers of  are labeled , # 
  
then  is labeled +; 3. if  is labeled , # then  has an attacker labeled +; 4. if  has an 
attacker labeled + then  is labeled , # 
 Theorem 1. (from [7]) Let L be a labeling of argumentation framework (
	, 	. It 
holds that L is a complete labeling iff for each argument 		
 it holds that: 1. if  is labeled 
+ then all its attackers are labeled , #; 2. if  is labeled , # then it has at least one attacker 
that is labeled +; 3. if  is labeled  -.! then it has at least one attacker that is labeled 
 -.! and it does not have an attacker that is labeled +. 
 Theorem 2. (from theorem 6 and 7 in [7]) Let   	
	, 	 be an argumentation 
framework. ' is the grounded labeling iff L is a complete labeling where undec(L) is maximal 
(w.r.t. set inclusion) among all complete labelings of . L is the preferred labeling iff L is a 
complete labeling where  +	', , #	' are maximal. 
 In figure 1 two argumentation graphs are depicted. Grounded semantics assigns the 
status of undec to all the arguments of 	, since it represents the complete labeling with the 
maximal undec-set, while in 	1, according to theorem 1, there is only one complete labeling 
(that is thus grounded and preferred), where argument  is in (no attackers),  is out and ! 
results in in. Note how  reinstates !. Regarding (A), there are two complete labelings where 
in(L) is maximal w.r.t. to set inclusion: one with +	'2  */, , #	'2  *, !/, 
 -.!	'2  ∅ and the other with +	'4  *, !/ and , #	'4  */ and  -.!	'4  ∅.  
  
Figure 1. Two Argumentation Graphs (A) and (B) 
PROBABILISTIC ARGUMENTATION FRAMEWORKS 
In this section we present earlier work in probabilistic argumentation frameworks that we 
progress. We start from the concept of  and its meaning. In the first work by Li [4], a 
probability measure is attached to each argument and attack relation of an abstract 
argumentation framework. Li et al. define these probabilities as the “likelihood of existence of 
an argument or attack relation” on the argumentation graph [4]. In [6], Hunter progresses the 
conceptual notion of . He admits that “what is meant by the probability of an argument 
holding is an open question”. He proposes a justification prospective similar to [4], where the 
probability indicates the degree to which the argument belongs (or is believed to belong) to the 
graph. Yet he also proposes an alternative view, referred to as the premises perspective on 
argument probability of being true. In this approach, the probability of each argument is based 
on the degree to which its premises are true, or are believed to be true. Our stance is closer to 
Hunter’s second view. Since an argument’s premises are affected by probabilistic uncertainty, 
we are left with an argument whose claim is affected by the same uncertainty, meaning that the 
claim holds with likelihood 5, and does not hold with likelihood 1 7 5.   
 We report the definition proposed by Li [4] used as baseline reference for this paper: 
A probabilistic argumentation framework PrAF is a tuple 	
, 8	, 9, :	 where 	
, 9 is an 
abstract argumentation framework,	8 ∶ 	
	 → 	0 ∶ 1< and : 	 ∶ 	9	 → 	 	0 ∶ 1<. 
 Key elements of Li et al.’s definition are the use of a probability for both arguments and 
attacks and the assumption of argument and attack independence (hence 8 and : are scalar 
  
numbers). Central to this is the way argument probability of acceptance is computed. The 
probabilistic nature of arguments, common to Li et al., Hunter and our research, implies that 
given an argumentation framework of  elements, 2 different scenarios are possible, each of 
them obtained by assuming each argument or attack relation to exist or not. Li et al. call these 
scenarios induced argumentation frameworks, each corresponding to a subgraph of the starting 
argumentation framework. Each induced argumentation framework has a probability of 
existing attached to it, computed by applying the product rule using 8 and :, and each 
induced framework behaves as an abstract Dung-style framework.  
 Thus, given a semantics (although only grounded semantics is analysed in [4]), Li et al. 
define the probability of acceptance of an extension as the sum of the probabilities of all the 
induced frameworks where the chosen semantics produce that extension. This computation, 
that requires computing the chosen semantic in all the subgraphs of the original argumentation 
framework, is referred to by Hunter as the constellation approach. Hunter [6] extends some of 
Li et al.’s definitions and investigates the situations where arguments might not be independent 
and the probability  is given as a joint probability distribution. 
 
Our Definition and its Differences from Previous Works 
Definition 7. (PAF). A probabilistic argumentation framework PAF is a couple 	, ) 
where	 = (
, ) is an abstract argumentation framework with a finite set of arguments 
 
and an attack relation  on 
 × 
; and  is a joint probability distribution over 
. 
 Our contribution to the formal definition of  is minor, and our definition is an 
extension of the previous work of Li et al. and Hunter. However, in the next section we will 
introduce new definitions of argument acceptability used in our computational analysis and 
based on the above definition, and it is thus important to make these modifications clear and 
explicit. Referring to Li et al.’s definition as a baseline, our  differs in the following 
respects: probabilities are only attached to arguments and induced frameworks are only 
identified by subsets of nodes, the probability P is a joint probability rather than a scalar 
function. Moreover, as described in the next section, we define acceptability at argument level 
rather than at extension level, we also introduce the probability of an argument to be labeled 
out or undec, we extend the definitions of the probability of argument acceptance by adding the 
credulous and skeptical acceptance of preferred semantics. 
 We end this section by clarifying some concepts of our  definition that are not 
discussed by Li et al. and Hunter, but that are useful to better understanding our computational 
analysis. In the definition of a PAF, given a generic argument , () is the probability that  
holds on its own, in isolation, before the dialectical process starts. It is the likelihood that the 
probabilistic premises of the argument are true, and thus the argument claim can be used in the 
argumentation process. Our aim is to compute the probabilities >?(), @AB(), A() that a 
generic argument  will be labeled in, out or undec under the chosen semantics. Algorithm 1 
proposes a brute force approach to computing >? (@AB , A are analogous).  
 The difference between () and >?() is crucial. If () is the probability of 
argument ’s claim to hold in isolation, before the argumentation process combines arguments, 
>?() is the probability of  being labeled in by the chosen semantics. >?() entails the 
effect of the argumentation process on , i.e. the fact that ’s conclusion might be invalidated 
by other arguments. Argument  could have a high probability of holding in isolation, but be 
  
completely invalidated in argumentation. It may be that : Joe got full marks in his math test, 
so he is good at math, but it might be also known that : Joe copied the test. Thus 	 
	  1, but since  attacks , then >?	  0 (the conclusion does not hold anymore) . 
Algorithm 1 - Brute force approach for computing CDE 
for each sub-graph % of 	
,  
use  to compute the probability 	% of % 
  for each argument  in % 
    assign a label F	 to  in % using the  
    chosen semantics 
    if F	  + add 	% to >?	   
 
Formalizing Scenarios and their Probabilities 
Given an argumentation framework   	
,  with |
|  , and the graph % identified by 

 and , we consider the set G of all the subgraphs of %. We define specific sets of 
subgraphs, i.e. elements of 2I. Given 	 ∈ 	r, we define: 
  * ∈ G	| ∈ /     ;     ̅  * ∈ G	| ∉ /   (1) 
that are respectively the set of subgraphs where argument  is present and the set of subgraphs 
where  is not present  (note how we use ̅ for the complementary set L).   
 We define a scenario as the argumentation framework identified by the subgraph 	and 
the restriction of  to . A scenario models the situation in which some arguments are assumed 
to hold and are present in the argumentation process and some arguments are assumed not to 
hold and are discarded from the dialectical process.  
 In general, we can express a set of subgraphs (and corresponding scenarios) combining 
some of the sets 2, . . , 	, 2MMM, . . , MMMM. with the connectives *∪,∩/. We write 1 to denote 
 ∩ 1 and  P 1 for  ∪ 1. For instance, in figure 1 the single subgraph/scenario with only  
and ! present is denoted with ̅1Q, while the expression 1 denotes a set of two 
subgraphs/scenarios where arguments  and  are present and ! can be either present or not. 
 We call clause R a finite intersection (or conjunction) of sets S , TU . We consider 
expressions of sets of scenarios in their disjunctive normal form, i.e. as a finite disjunction of 
clauses R2 P R4P. . PRV.   
 It is possible to compute the probability of each subgraph/scenario starting from the 
probability . If 
  *2, . . , /, a single scenario/subgraph is a clause of length  modeling 
a generic situation in which W probabilistic arguments are assumed to hold while the other 
 7 X are not. The probability Y	 of this generic scenario  is the joint probability: 
Y	  	2 ∧ 4 ∧ …∧ W ∧ [\2MMMMMM ∧ …∧ MMM)   (2) 
The probability of a set of scenarios YY	 is the sum of the probabilities of each scenario in 
the set. Thus, regarding the set of scenarios , by marginalization on argument : 
YY	  ∑ Y	Y∈8  	 and YY	̅  1 7 	   (3) 
Since every set of scenarios can be expressed by the conjunction of expressions containing 
only the sets S , TU , using the above equation the probability of any set of subgraphs can be 
expressed using . For instance ^ ^	1  	 ∧ , ^ ^	 P 1M  	 ∨ `.  
  
Labeling Scenarios and Acceptance 
Given a scenario 	 ∈ a (a being the set of all the scenarios), the labeling of  follows the rules 
of the chosen semantics. We define a scenario labeling ℒ as a total function over the Cartesian 
product of arguments in 
 and scenarios in a, thus ℒ: Ar × S → {+, , #,  -.!}. When 
labeling a scenario, we follow this choice: an argument  is labeled out in all the scenarios 
where  does not hold (i.e. it is out because it is assumed not to hold on its own) or when it 
holds but it is labeled out by the semantics, representing the effect on  of other arguments. 
 Regarding grounded semantics there is only one labeling per scenario , that we call 
ℒe(). In the case of preferred labeling there could be more than one valid labeling per 
scenario. Each preferred labeling for scenario  is referred to as ℒS
fg() and the set of the 
preferred labelings of a scenario  as hfg() = {ℒ2
fg(), . . , ℒ
fg()}. We call +(ℒi()), 
, #(ℒi()), 	 -.!(ℒi()) the sets of argument labeled in, out, undec in ℒi(), with 5 
denoting the semantics used (either  or 
). In order to study how an argument behaves across 
scenarios in a, we define the following set of scenarios. For grounded semantics: 
>?
e = { ∈ a:  ∈ +(ℒe, )}	; 	@AB
e = { ∈ a:  ∈ , #(ℒe, )} 
A
e = { ∈ a:  ∈  -.!(ℒe, )} 
which represent all the scenarios where argument  is labeled in, out or undec. Regarding 
preferred semantics, since there could be more than one labeling for each scenario , we define 
two extreme sets corresponding to skeptical and credulous attitudes. The credulous set is 
identified by requiring argument  to be labeled in at least in one of the valid preferred 
labelings for . Hence we define: 
>?
fg\ = k ∈ a:	l∃	ℒfg() ∈ hfg() ∶ 	 ∈ +(ℒfg , )mn		 
@AB
fg\ = k ∈ a:	l∃	ℒfg() ∈ hfg() ∶ 	 ∈ , #(ℒfg , )mn 
A
fg\ = k ∈ a:	l∃	ℒfg() ∈ hfg() ∶ 	 ∈  -.!(ℒfg, )mn 
While the skeptical sets are: 
>?
fgo = >?
fg ∖ l@AB
fg ⋃A
fgm		; 		@AB
fgo = @AB
fg ∖ (>?
fg⋃A
fg) ; A
fgo = A
fg ∖ (@AB
fg ⋃>?
fg)  (4) 
representing scenarios where argument  has the same label in all the preferred labeling of a 
scenario. It is >?
fgo ⊆ >?
fg\, @AB
fgo ⊆ @AB
fg\ , A
fgo ⊆ A
fg\
 and the two sets of scenarios identify 
an upper and lower probability level. We add a last useful notation. We write rst for all the 
scenarios where	 holds and it results labeled out. Note that @AB = ̅ + rst. 
 Definition 8. We define the probabilities of acceptance (5), of rejection (6) and 
undecided probability (7) of argument  for grounded and preferred semantics as follows:  
8
e = (>?
e ),	8
\ = (>?
fg\),	8o = (>?
fgo)              (5) 
8
eMMMM = (@AB
e ),	8
\MMMM = (@AB
fg\ ),	8
oMMMM = (@AB
fgo )          (6) 
8
e = (A
e),		8o = (A
fgo),		8
\ = (A
fg\)           (7) 
 Example 1 Let us consider the graph of figure 1 (A), and let us study the properties of 
argument . There are 3 arguments, thus 2u  8 scenarios. Let us presume 	  	1 
	Q  0.8 and , , ! are statistically independent. Let us start computing >?
e
. Argument  is 
  
labeled in in all the scenarios where it holds and  does not hold (and ! becomes irrelevant). 
Using our notation   1M  (i.e. the set of subgraphs {*/, {, !}}. It is undec when all the 
arguments are present, i.e. the single scenario A
e = 1Q (i.e. {{, , !}}) and it is labeled out 
when it is assumed not to hold or when  is in and ! is out, i.e. @AB
e = ̅ + 1Q̅ (set  
{∅, {}, {!}, {, }, {, !}}). By inserting numerical values we have: 
8
e = 0.16, 	8
e = 0.512, 	8
eMMMM = 0.328. 
 Regarding preferred semantics, we can verify that:  
>?
fg\ = 	1M + 1Q,							l>?
fg\m ≡ 8
\ = 0.672 
>?
fgo = 1M,																						l>?
fgom ≡ 8o = 0.16 
A
fg\ = A
fgo = ∅ 
@AB
fg\ = ̅ + 1,														@AB
fg\  ≡ 8
\MMMM = 0.84 
@AB
fgo = ̅ + 1Q̅, 										@AB
fgo  ≡ 8
oMMMM = 0.328.  
COMPUTING }DE: A RECURSIVE ALGORITHM 
This section presents an algorithm to compute >? , @AB under grounded semantics. Given a 
starting argument  and a label F ∈ {+, , #}, we need to find the set of subgraphs where 
argument  is legally labeled in. The idea is to traverse the transpose graph (a graph with 
reversed arrows) from  down to its attackers, propagating the constraints of the grounded 
labeling. While traversing the graph, the various paths correspond to a set of subgraphs. The 
constraints needed are listed in definition 5 and theorem 1. If argument  – attacked by n 
arguments 5 – is required to be labeled +, we impose the set >? to be: 
>? =  ∩ l~2@AB ∩ ~4@AB ∩ …	∩ ~@ABm					 condition (1) 
i.e. argument  can be labeled in in the subgraphs where: 
1.  is present in the subgraph (i.e. the set  and 
2. all the attacking arguments 5S are labeled , # (sets ~S@AB.  
If  is required to be labeled , #, the set of subgraphs is: 
@AB = ̅ ∪  ∩ l~2>? ∪ ~4>? ∪ …	∪ ~>?m						 condition (2) 
i.e.  is labeled , # in all the subgraphs where it is not present or at least one of the attackers 
is labeled +. Thus we recursively traverse the graph, finding the subgraphs that are compatible 
with the starting label of . The sets ~@AB, ~>? are found when terminal nodes are reached. 
When a terminal node 5B is reached the following conditions are applied: 
1. if 5B is required to be + then ~B>? = ~B 
2. if node 5B is required to be , # then ~B@AB = ~BMMMM 
 The way the algorithm treats cycles guarantees that only grounded complete labelings 
are identified. If a cycle is detected, the recursion path terminates, returning an empty set that 
also has the effect of discarding all the sets of subgraphs linked with a logical 9 (by 
condition 1) to the cyclic path. We present the pseudo-code of the algorithm, while Table 1 
describes the steps for computing >? in the graph of figure 2 right.  
 
  
Algorithm 2 - The Recursive FindSet(A,L,P) Algorithm 
A is a node, L a label (IN or OUT), P is the list of parent nodes, Cset holds 
the partial result of the computation of conditions (1) and (2). 
FindSet(A,L,P): 
if A in P:  
   return empty_set // Cycle found 
if L = IN:            
   if A terminal: 
      return a // Terminal condition for IN Label 
   else: 
      add A to P 
      for each child C of A 
         Cset = Cset AND FindSet(C,OUT,P) 
return (a AND Cset)      // condition 1 
if L = OUT:           
   if A terminal:  
      return NOT(a) // Terminal condition for OUT Label 
   else 
      add A to P 
      for each child C of A 
  Cset = Cset OR FindSet(C,IN,P) 
      return (NOT(a) OR (a AND Cset))   //condition 2    
Table 1. Recursively applying Algorithm 2 on the graph of figure 3 left. 
 Node,  
label 
Constraint Parent List Comment 
1↓ >? >? =  ∩ 1@AB < a must exist and b=OUT 
2↓ 1@AB 1@AB  1M ∪ 	1	Q>? ∪ 9>? < b is out when b does not exist or b 
exists and c = in or d = in  
3= Q>? Q>?  Q ∩ @AB , < c=IN when c exists and a=OUT. 
Cycle with a, Q>?  ∅ 
4= 9>? 9>?  9 , < d is initial 
5↑ 1@AB 1@AB  1M ∪ 	1 ∩ D 
6↑ >? A  A	 ∩ lBU ∪ 	B ∩ Dm  BU P 19 
 
         
Figure 3. 
Extension to Preferred Labeling 
The constraints used in Algorithm 2 – argument  is in when all the attackers are out and 	is 
out if one attacker is in – are properties of any complete labeling. The way algorithm 2 treats 
cycles – it always assigns the undec label to their arguments – guarantees that we collect only 
grounded complete labeling. Since a preferred labeling is complete, the extension of algorithm 
2 to the case of preferred semantics requires changing only the way cycles are treated. The 
following lemma is useful in always assigning an argument labeled in in a complete labeling to 
the computation of >?
fg\
. 
  
 Lemma 1. If  is labeled in (or out) in a complete labeling of a scenario, then the 
scenario can be assigned to >?
fg\
 (or  @ABfg\ ). 
Proof. If  is labeled in in a complete labeling Q of a scenario , either Q is the preferred one 
maximizing +	Q,  w.r.t. to set inclusion, or there is another Q’ with +	Q,  ⊂ +	Q, . 
Since   ∈ +	Q, , then  ∈ +	Q,  and scenario  contributes to >?
fg\
. 
 We return to the treatment of cycles. When a cycle is detected, the labeling of an even-
length cycle is consistent since the argument that is visited twice and identifies the cycle is 
required to have the same label. However, an odd-length cycle creates an inconsistent undec 
labeling not contributing to >?
fg\
 or  @AB
fg\
. Thus we assign a clause (i.e. set of scenarios) to 
>?
fg\
 when a consistent cycle is found, while we reject the scenario otherwise. Note how the 
skeptical sets >?
fgo
 and @AB
fgo
 can be derived once the credulous sets are computed using 
equations 4. In traversing the graph, we thus need to remember the label required for an 
argument to check if the cycle can be consistently labeled. It is important to bear in mind that 
rst (small letter for the label) identifies the set of scenarios where argument  exists and it is 
labeled out (note that @AB = ̅ + rst). Let us consider the graph depicted in figure 3 left. 
This contains both odd and even length cycles. Table 2 shows the steps in computing >?\ . 
Table 2. Computing >?
fg\
 of figure 3 left 
1 >? = 1@AB@AB 
2a 1@AB = 1M + 1rst9>? 2b @AB = M + rst>? 
3a 1rst9>? = 1rst9Q@AB 3b rst>? = rst@AB 
4a 1rst9Q@AB = 1rst9Q̅ + 1rst9Q1>?
= 19Q̅ + 	∅ 
	+!,+#.#	!!F. 
4b rst@AB =  
	!,+#.#	!!F.:	.	-		.5+#, . = +, 
= , # 
5a 1@AB = 1M + 19Q̅ 5b @AB = M +  
6 >?\ = 	1M + 19Q̅	M +  = 	1MM + 1M + 19Q̅M + 19Q̅ 
Note how the 3-length cycle creates an inconsistent situation 1rst9Q1>? (argument  has to 
exist and be labeled in and out at the same time) while rst@AB can be labeled consistently 
(the cycle is consistent when argument . is required to exist and labeled out). We can verify 
that >?o  differs from >?\  since it discards the even-length cycle , thus the path  (and 
any path in an and condition with it) are not in >?o  . 
Notable Examples: Accrual of Attacks 
Let us consider the  in figure 4 left. Argument  is labeled in iff  holds and both  and 
! are labeled out (satisfied only when  and ! do not hold, since  and ! are inital). Thus: 
>? = 1QMMMM			; 	@AB = ̅ + 1 + 1MQ 
which represents the accrual of a probabilistic network. Note how this differs from 
mainstream numerical argumentation approaches where no accrual occurs [9, 1] and the effect 
of n arguments can be equated with the effect of the argument with the maximum degree. In 
the probabilistic accrual every argument counts, to the extent given by their joint probability. 
  
                           
Figure 4. Accrual (left), Reinstatement (center) and a circle of arguments (right). 
Notable Examples: Reinstatement 
When an argument  attacks , argument  is in iff  exists and  does not hold, thus 
>? = 1M , @AB  ̅ P 1. The case of 3 isolated arguments (figure 4 center) is useful in 
analyzing the reinstatement property. It is easy to verify this: 
>?  1M P 1Q	, @AB  ̅ P 1Q̅ 
In the generic case of  arguments, >? we have: 
	>?  12MMM P 12141uMMM P ⋯							 ; 							@AB  ̅ P 1214MMM P 12141u1MMM P ⋯ 
The statistical independence of arguments makes evident some reinstatement properties. By 
using the fact that 	~  1 7 	~M the expression of >?	 can be written as follows: 
>?	  	 7 		2 P 		2	4 7 ⋯ 
Note how >?	 is the sum of the probabilities of all the paths terminating in . The paths 
terminating with a defender (odd length) are positive factors contributing to >?	 and vice 
versa for the path ending with an attacker of . The reinstatement effect of attackers and 
defenders decreases with the length of the path, but all influence >?	.  
 We now compare the reinstatement of a  to other argumentation approaches. 
 PAF. An argument is always reinstated but with a lower probability (note how it is fully 
reinstated only when 	!  1). All the arguments on the chain contribute to the reinstatement 
with decreasing effect. 
 Dung’s Abstract AF. In an abstract argumentation framework, arguments in a chain are 
reinstated at full potential, since the chain is made up of both in arguments (defended by the 
initial argument) and out arguments (attacked by the initial argument). 
 Pollock [9]. The arguments presented in [9] have a degree of justification in \. This 
degree is a subtractable cardinal quantity. Referring to figure 4 center, when an argument c	of 
degree J attacks  of degree J then the new degree of  after the attack is  J  max	 J 7
J, 0 and J  max	 J 7 J, 0. Thus argument  is fully reinstated when J  J, and not 
reinstated (at all) if J  J while in all other cases it is reinstated proportionally to J 7 J. 
Note how, unlike a , it is relative comparison of degrees that decides the reinstatement. 
 Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex's vs-defense. In [1], a strength is attached to attack 
relations. Argument  is fully reinstated iff S  S, otherwise it remains totally defeated. 
Thus it is the relative comparison of the strength of the attacks that defines reinstatement. We 
notice that, although attack from C to B is logically antecedent to that from B to A, it is 
neglected if S  S. Generally, apart from , the distance of an argument from the first 
node  in the chain is not linked to its impact on  and the strength of reinstatement is usually  
a relative comparison of strength, with the consequence that some attacks might be neglected. 
 In the case of arguments forming a cycle, let us consider the case of two arguments  
and  rebutting each other. In a PAF with grounded semantics we have: 
  
>?
e = 1	U , @AB
e = 	U , A
e = 1 
>? is unchanged compared to the case where  attacks  but not vice versa, while the not 
null A decreases @AB. The counter attack from  to  does not improve >?	. This is the 
expected behavior of grounded semantics: an argument cannot reinstate itself but it needs a 
third external argument. In the case of grounded semantics, the skeptical set >?\  neglects the 
attacker  (>?\ =  since  fully reinstates itself; the skeptical set is equal to the grounded 
case (>?o = 1	U . It is also Ao = A\ = ∅ and @AB\ = 	U + 1,	@ABo = 	U  
SENSITIVITY TO CHANGES IN  OR 
 
The expression of >? (@AB or A) allows us to study a set of properties of argument	 in 
relation to the arguments in 
. An interesting set of properties is the study of the sensitivity of 
>?	 to a change in the probability  of an argument (for instance when new evidence on its 
validity are found); or to the addition/removal of an argument to/from 
 (here we limit to the 
situation of adding an argument attacking or rebutting an argument in 
). 
 The interest is mainly due to its applications: an agent might want to understand the 
effect of extra evidence affecting an argument, or which are the arguments that have the 
maximum impact on >?	. In a legal dispute, a lawyer deciding on his/her its strategy might 
focus on which arguments he should challenge in court. We first define two useful 
measurements of change. 
 Definition 9. The partial differential gain of argument  w.r.t. to argument  is 		
	
 
The sign of the differential gain tells whether an argument should be attacked or defended in 
order to increase 	>?, while its value quantifies the impact of the argument on . 
  Definition 10. We call argument  a dialectical defender of  iff  	
	
> 0, and  is 
a dialectical attacker of  when 	
	
< 0 
Let us now define a particular expression of >?, that contains information about how the  
behaves in relation to changes. 
 Definition 11. Given an argument  and an argument  for which there is at least a 
path from  to , we call the normal form of >? w.r.t. to  the following expression of >?: 
>? = 	~1 +  1M + Q, with ~ ∩   = ∅. 
The term ~1 represents the set of scenarios contributing to >? where argument  is assumed 
to hold.  1M  represents the set of scenarios contributing to >? but requiring  not to hold. Q is 
the set of scenarios contributing to >? where the status of   is irrelevant.  
 It can be proved that argument  is always labeled in in the set ~1. If, ad absurdum,  
is labeled out in a scenario  in ~1, then the same scenario where  does not hold has the 
same labeling and it would also contribute to >? and thus the status of  would have been 
irrelevant and the scenario would have been part of the set Q and not ~1, contradicting the 
hypothesis. Hence we can rewrite the normal form as follows: 
>? = 	~1>? +  1M + Q , with ~ ∩   = ∅. 
  Why is this form useful? The expression makes explicit the contribution of arg.  to 
>?.When =   = ∅ ,	>? = Q and  does not contribute to >? and thus >?	. A change in 
	 does not affect . Thus  is neither an attacker nor a defender of , and differential gain 
  
w.r.t.  is null. If ~ = ∅ then 	>? =  1M + Q. We can compute the dialectical gain w.r.t. 
argument . In the rest of this section, we use  also for ^ ^ to simplify the notation (bearing in 
mind how the probability distribution ^ ^ defined over a set of scenarios is derived from the 
distribution  defined over arguments, as shown in equation 3).  
 We compute the dialectical gain by first evaluating the difference in 	>? when 	 
is increased by ∆. Since 	 = 1 − 	M, a change in 	 of ∆ is a decrement of lMm by 
∆, and since 	 1M = 	  ∧ 1M = 	 |1M	1M = 	 |1MlMm we write: 
	>?\∆ − 	>? = 	 |1MllMm − ∆m − 	 |1MlMm = −	 |1M∆ < 0 
The differential gain is: 
¢>?	
¢	
= lim
∆→
	>?\∆ − 	>?
∆
= −l ¥Mm < 0 
meaning that incrementing  will decrease the value of 	>?, thus making  a dialectical 
attacker of . In case of statistical independence we have 	
	
= −		 . 
  Similarly, if   = ∅ then  results a dialectical defender and the differential gain is 
	~|. We bear in mind that 	 is constant in the computation while  >?	 varies. In 
the general case, when both  ~ and   are not empty,  is a defender when 	~| >
	l ¥Mm and an attacker when 	~| < 	l ¥Mm. Thus: 
Proposition 1. Given the normal form of >? w.r.t. b >? = 	~1>? +  1M + Q, the 
differential dialectical gain of  w.r.t. to  is: 
¢>?	
¢	
= 	~| − l ¥Mm	 
In case of statistical independence of arguments it is:  	
	
= 			~ − 	  
 Example 3. Let us consider figure 3 (left) again and let us presume that 	 =
1, 	 = 0.8, 	! = 	- = 0.7 all independent. We saw that >? = 	19 + 1M and thus 
>?	 = 0.2 + 0.56 = 0.76. Table 3 reports the normal forms of  w.r.t. to argument , - and 
!.  
Table 3. Dialectical gains for Example 4  
Normal form of ¦ w.r.t. § ¨ © 	
	
= 			~ − 	   
ª >? = 1« + 1M  1 ∅ 1M  		1 = 0.8 
¬ >? = 9U­U + 9 ∅ 9U 9 −		9U = −0.3 
® >? = 	19 + 1M ∅ ∅ 	19 + 1M 0 
 
Argument - is a defender (  = ∅),  an attacker (~ = ∅) and ! is neither an attacker nor a 
defender. The dialectical gain of  w.r.t.  is −0.3 while for - is 0.8. Thus, if we want to 
increase		>? it is better to increase 	- rather than reduce 	. How much do we need to 
increase 	- to get 	>? > 0.9? Since 	>? needs to be increased by 0.14 (from 0.76 to 
0.9), and since  	
	°
=0.8, 	- should be increased by 0.14/0.8 = 0.175. Note that the 
same effect could have been obtained by decreasing 	 of a greater quantity equal to 0.47. 
  
Adding a new argument attacking or rebutting an argument in 
  
In a dialectical process an argument is usually modified not only internally but by adding a 
new (maybe indirect) attack on it as depicted in figure 5. Let us study the situation in which a 
new argument ² attacks , but not vice-versa.  
 
Figure 5. Attacking B via argument ³ 
 
 Proposition 2. Given the normal form of >? w.r.t. b >? = 	~1>? +  1M + Q, if a 
new initial argument ² is added to the argumentation framework and if  is the only argument 
attacked by ², then the dialectical gain of a w.r.t. to ² is: 
¢>?	
¢	²
	= −l	~1|² − 	 1|²m	- 
¢>?	
¢	²
	= −	
¢>?	
¢	
		+	
 ´.#		-	²	
.	+-..-.# 
  Proof. A convenient way to show how >? changes is to consider argument  attacked 
by ² and to substitute arguments  and ² with an argument ’ that encompasses the effect of 
² on . Argument ’ will be labeled out in the scenarios where  is assumed not to hold or 
where it holds but argument ² defeats it. ’ is labeled in when argument  holds and argument 
² does not hold. Thus ′ has the following properties: 1>?  1>?³U  and 1@AB  1M P 1³. 
Hence by substituting in the normal form we have: 
>?
¶  	~1>?³U P  	1M P 1³ P Q 
The difference in  	>? is: 
	>?
¶  7 	>?  	~1³U  P 	 1M P 	 1³ P 	Q 7 	~1 7 	 1M 7 	Q
 7	~1³ P 	 1³  7	²		~1|² 7 	 1|² 
And the differential gain of  w.r.t. ² is 	
	¶
 7		~1|² 7 	 1|²). If  and ² are 
independent we have 	
	¶
 7	l	~ 7 	 m	1  7	 	
	
 
Let us now presume that ² rebuts  and  is the only argument attacked by ² (figure 5 right). 
 Proposition 3. Given the normal form of >? w.r.t. to   >?  	~1>? P  1M P Q, if 
a new argument ² is added to the argumentation framework and if ² and  are rebuttals and 
if  is the only argument attacked by ², then the dialectical gain of a w.r.t. to ² is: 
¢>?	
¢	²
 7	~1|² 
 Proof. When ² is added, the set of scenarios in Q are clearly still contributing to >? 
since the status of argument  is irrelevant. The sets of scenarios ~1>? and A 1M  are not 
affected by argument ² when ² is assumed not to hold (thus ~1³U  and  1M³U contributes to 
>?) while when ² is assumed to hold, the set of scenarios ~1>? require argument  to be 
labeled in, which is no longer the case since ² rebuts  and thus  cannot be labeled in. 
  
Regarding the scenarios in  1M , they still contribute to >? since  is required not to hold and 
so ² is disconnected from  and therefore irrelevant. Thus: 
>?
· = ³U 	~1 +  1M + Q +³	 1M + Q = ~1³U +	 1M + Q  
	>?
·  − 	>? = 	~1³U  + 	 1M + 	Q − 	~1 − 	 1M − 	Q
= −	~1³ = −	²	~1|²) 
And the differential gain of a w.r.t. ² is ()
(¶)
= −(~1|²). In the case of the statistical 
independence of arguments, it is: ()
(¶)
= −()(~)() 
 We note how the dialectical gains w.r.t.  and ² have opposite sign, as expected. In the 
case of a rebuttal, proposition 3 states that the dialectical gain is always negative or null (when 
~ = ∅), consequence of the fact that a rebuttal under grounded semantics does not defeat the 
attacked argument. 
 Example 4. We continue example 3, where we found that 	 ()
(°)
=0.8 and ()
()
=
−0.3. Let us presume that we could attack argument - and we want again to bring (>?) 
above 0.9. If we attack - we have no way to increase (>?), since the dialectical gain of  
w.r.t. - is positive. Let us consider argument . The normal form is 9U1M + 9 and the 
dialectical gain w.r.t. to  is −0.3. If we attack  with a new argument ², according to prop. 2, 
the dialectical gain is −0.3 ∗ −() = 0.24. In order to increase 	>? by 0.14, argument ² 
should at least have a strength of 0.14/0.24, about 0.583. If we rebut argument  with ², since 
~ = ∅ in the normal form w.r.t. , proposition 3 tells us that argument ² would have no effect.  
AN EXAMPLE OF APPLICATION: A LEGAL CASE 
In order to make our  applicable, we must provide a structure for arguments and attacks. 
We describe a single rule argument model adapted from [10], that keeps the discussion simple, 
but is adequate for illustration. Let us consider a set of atomic propositions  = {2, . . , } and 
the propositional language ℒ closed under negation with atoms in  and connectives {∧, ¬}. 
We define an argument as a defeasible inference rule of the kind: R → ¹ where R,¹ ∈ ℒ. 
Defeasible means that a rule admits exceptions and it can be invalidated by other arguments. 
Note how our definition is limits argument to a single rule (adequate for our illustrative 
example), instead of including derivation trees composed by chain of rules as in [10].  
If we call ℛ is the set of rules, we define a function of conflict U : ℒ → 2ℒ ∪ 2ℛ, that allows us 
to define asymmetric conflicts among propositions and rules. If  = M then when  is asserted 
 cannot be asserted, but not viceversa. It is  = ¬MMMM and ¬ = M.	 If  = 
̅ and 
 is a rule, this 
means that  is an exception to rule 
, when  is asserted 
 is invalid. Note how this function 
models conflicts, but also preferences:  = M could model the fact that  is preferred to .  
Each argument has an associated probability equal to the probability 	R of its premises R 
(this means we know the joint probability 	 of all the propositions used in the premises of 
the arguments, representing our available evidence used to build arguments). We define three 
forms of attack: rebuttals, undermining and undercutting. Given two arguments :R8 → ¹8 
and 1:R» → ¹», we say that  rebuts 1 iff ¹8 = ¹»MMMM and ¹» = ¹8MMMM,  undermines 1 iff 
¹8 = R»MMMM, i.e. an argument conclusion excludes a premise of another argument, and  
  
undercuts 1 iff  ¹8 = 1M , i.e. the conclusion ¹8 invalidates the rule 1. An undercutting attack 
model the fact that defeasible rules (such as 1) might have exceptions (such as ¹8). Note how 
a rebuttal is always a symmetric attack, an undermining could be (it is iff ¹8 = R»MMMM and 
R» = ¹8MMMM), while an undercut is always defined as asymmetric (the exception defeats the rule 
but not viceversa). Given a set of arguments 
 of the kind RS → ¹S, we can represent them on 
a   		
, ,  using as  the probability of each argument 	RS, and using rebuttals 
and undercutting attack to define the attack relation .  
 We present an application of  to legal reasoning. Paul and John are on trial for the 
assassination of Sam. The following evidence is available. First it is known with certainty that 
John entered the room where the murder took place at 1 pm and left at 3 pm, while Paul 
entered at 3 pm and he was found by the police at 5 pm. A forensic test suggests that the 
probability that Sam died between 1 pm and 3 pm is 0.6 and between 3 pm and 5 pm is 0.4. 
The test used has an accuracy of 0.9. Thus we have the following arguments (in square 
brackets the probability of each premise): 
¼½	2: (John was in the room between 1 to 3 [1]) ∧ 4: (the medical test says that Sam died 
between 1 and 3 [0.6] )  →  u: (John shot Sam) 
¼C	: (Paul was in the room between 3 and 5 [1]) ∧ ¾: (the test says that Sam died 
between 3 and 5 [0.4]) → ¿: (Paul shot Sam) 
ÀÁ	Â: (The test is void [0.1]) →  ÃMMM ∧ MMMM   (Sam’s time of death cannot be estimated) 
 The probability of each argument is:	Ã  0.6,   0.4 and Ät  0.1. We also have 
lÃ ∧ m  0, since Sam either died between 1 and 3 pm or between 3 and 5 pm. Argument 
Ät undercuts (invalidates) both Ã and . Since Ã  0.6  0.5  , John’s lawyer asks for 
a fingerprint analysis of the murder weapon. The result is that with a probability of 0.7 the 
fingerprints are Paul’s. The lawyer thus proposes a new argument: 
ÅC	Æ:	( The test says that the fingerprints are Paul’s  [0.7])→	¿: (Paul shot Sam)  
 This argument rebuts Ã (conclusions are conflicting, since it is clearly u  ¿MMM and 
¿  uMMM). In any case, further analysis by the police labs states that the weapon was tampered 
with, and the test is only 50% reliable. The new argument (with a probability of 0.5): 
ÇÅ	È:	( the test is void [0.5]) →  MMM   (fingerprints are not valid evidence)  
 undercuts the validity of . Paul’s lawyer counter-attacks using the testimony of a credible 
witness who heard a shot at 2 pm, when only John was in the room. The witness is reputable 
with a probability of 0.8. Thus the following argument is built by the judge: 
É 2: (A shot was heard at 2pm [0.8]) ∧ 2: (John was in the room between 1 to 3 [1])  → 
u: (John shot Sam) ∧ M¾ (Sam died at 2 pm, not between 3 pm and 5 pm) 
 
     
Figure 6. Argumentation Graphs for the legal case 
Argument Probability  
Ã 0.6 lÃ ∧ m  0 
 0.4 
Ät 0.1 All arguments 
independent ³ 0.8 
ÊË 0.5 
 0.7 
  
Note how the way we wrote argument ³ means that the judge considers the witness’ 
testimony a more definitive evidence than the medical test (³ implies ¾MMM), and thus argument 
³ undercuts Ì and rebuts . The final graph is depicted in figure 6.  A grey line indicates 
rebuttals between arguments with mutually exclusive premises (Ã and ). We marked with  
the arguments whose conclusion is against Paul and with Í the arguments against John. Other 
arguments are marked =, indicating they do not add to the conclusion but interact with  and Í. 
 
Analysis 
There are 6 arguments and potentially 64 different scenarios. Let us call %f and %Ã the set of 
scenarios where Paul (or John) are guilty (i.e. at least one argument supporting the conclusion 
is labeled in), and  = 	% and Ã = 	%Ã. There are two arguments against John, Ã and 
³. If we apply algorithm 2 to find the Ã>? and ³>? sets, it is easy to verify that we obtain:  
Ã>? = ÃÄB
MMMM		lMMM + fÊËm ; ³>? = ³lMMM + fÊËm 
%W = Ã>? ∨³>? = ÃÄB
MMMM		lMMM + fÊËm +³lMMM + fÊËm = 0.6278 
Note that, in computing Ã>? we do not care about attacker  since lW ∧ fm = 0. 
Regarding Paul, there are two arguments  and  against him and he is guilty when  ∨ :  
>? = ÄBMMMM	³U 		and >? = ÊËMMM		[U + ÃÄB 
% = >? ∨ >? = ÄBMMMM	³U + ÊËMMM	[U 		= ÄBMMMM	³U + ÊËMMM	fMMMMÄB + ÄBMMMM + ÄB³ = 0.284 
 John’s lawyer has to find a way of decreasing the probability of the evidence against 
John. If we compute the dialectical gain, we find that the dialectical gain of %W w.r.t. ² is equal 
to 0.416, w.r.t. Ät is −0.052 and w.r.t. to ÊË  is 0.6104. Therefore the the best chance of 
minimizing John's guilt is to decrease ÊË, i.e. to show that the test is valid in more than 50% of 
cases. In order to put the probability Ã below 0.5 we need a change in ÊË of 	0.5 − Ã/
0.6104	 = 	0.21, therefore ÊË should go down to about 29% from 50%. An alternative is to 
decrease ³ – make the witness against Paul less credible. In that case, ³ should be decreased 
by about 0.307 (from the current 0.8 down to below 0.5) in order to bring %Ã below 0.5. Ät 
has too minimal a dialectical gain to be used.  
Regarding Paul, his lawyer wants to know if the potential moves of John’s lawyer could 
affect Paul, i.e. could they increase % above 0.5. The dialectical gains for %f are shown in 
table 4 left. Since  = 0.284, % goes above 0.5 if either ³ is decreased by 0.416	or if ÊË is 
decreased by 0.4917 down to 10%, meaning that a fingerprint test should have a 90% 
accuracy. These values could be safe enough for the lawyer and they are greater than what is 
needed by John’s lawyer to bring  below 0.5, so in this example there could be a collusion 
where both of the suspects are below 0.5. Nevertheless, Paul’s lawyer should focus on further 
invalidating the fingerprint test. 
Table 4. Dialectical Gain of Arguments  %and %Ãw.r.t. to ³,ÊË , Ät 
Dialectical gain of % w.r.t. to ³,ÊË , Ät Dialectical gain of %Ãw.r.t. to ³,ÊË ,Ät 
³ -0.519 ³ 0.416 
Ät -0.022 Ät -0.052 
ÊË -0.4396 ÊË 0.6104 
  
RELATED WORKS 
 
The idea of merging probabilities and abstract argumentation was first presented by Dung et 
al. [3], and a more detailed formalization was provided by Li et al. [4], along with the works by 
Hunter [6] and Thimm [14]. In Li et al.’s definition  is not a joint probability but a scalar 
function 
 → [0,1] and a similar scenario-like approach (extension-based rather than 
argument-based) is used. Li et al.’s work is limited to fully independent arguments with 
grounded semantics, and no exact computation behind the brute force algorithm is analyzed 
,while our paper also considers preferred semantics, providing an algorithm to compute  
and studying the behavior of  w.r.t. to reinstatement, accrual, and response to changes. 
 Thimm in [14],and Hunter [6] in his epistemic approach, start from a complementary 
angle. Both authors assume that there is already an uncertainty measure – potentially not 
probabilistic – defined on the admissibility set of each argument (i.e. >? is given as a function 
>?: 
 → [0,1]). Starting from	>? rather than  poses the question: which >? assignments 
are acceptable? The authors both argue that only a subset of these measurements can be 
sensibly associated with an argumentation framework. They define a series of rules to identify 
a rationally acceptable probability distribution of >?, such as the rationality and p-justifiability 
properties.  In our paper we follow a complementary approach, since our aim is to start from  
(assumed to be a probability measure) and then compute >?.  
 Regarding other works investigating gradualism in argumentation, we first mention 
Pollock’s work on degrees of justification [9]. Pollock rejects the use of probabilities to 
propagate numerical values on an argumentation framework, but he considers probabilities the 
only valid proxy for argument strength, and he uses the statistical syllogism as the standard 
comparison to measure strengths. Pollock considers the strengths of arguments as cardinal 
quantities that can be subtracted. The accrual of arguments is denied (except for a rebutting and 
an undercutting argument) and it is the argument with the maximum strength that defines the 
attack. In an argument chain, it is the argument with minimum strength that defines the 
strength of the conclusions. The  model proposed by Cayrol and Dupin de Saint-Cyr [5] infers 
a measure of argument strengths from their position in the argumentation framework. This 
extrinsic strength cannot be mapped to probability or beliefs, and leads to an ordering on the 
arguments that does not fit our problem. The vs-defence model, by Cayrol and and Lagasquie-
Schiex [1], is an extension of AF where attacks have a strength associated with them. 
Argument admissibility status is the result of the comparisons of attack strengths. We have 
seen two main problems: there is no description about how to compute such a strength, how to 
practically set a priority level and a preferral order, as Pollock wrote in [9]: if we were to be 
serious about arguments' strength, there must be a way to measure it. 
 In [1], the authors propose an argumentation framework with various degrees of 
attacks. They extend a work by Martinez & Garcia [12] that first extended Dung’s 
argumentation framework, introducing different levels of attacks. The work contributes to the 
development of argumentation with attacks of different strength. [8] was the first research to 
suggest the use of weights both on arguments and on attacks and Dunne et al. [11] have 
proposed weighted argument systems in which attacks have a numeric weight, indicating how 
reluctant one would be to disregard the attack. They accept that attacks can have different 
weights, and such weights might have different interpretations: an agent-based priority voting, 
or a measure of how many premises of the attacked argument are compromised. 
  
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS 
We have analyzed probabilistic argumentation frameworks and provided a first recursive 
algorithm to compute the probability of argument acceptance. We also studied various 
properties such as sensitivity to changes and behavior in the presence of reinstatement, accruals 
and cycles. We showed how PAF can be used as a tool to argue with probabilistic information. 
Our results could be used by agents involved in a discussion, in order to select the best move in 
a dialectical process or to analyze the sensitivity of the conclusions found. We believe that this 
is a contribution to the debate about gradualism in argumentation to justify further research in 
the theoretical and applicative studies of . Future developments may lie in the extension to 
other forms of uncertainty such as possibility or fuzzy/multi-value logic. Much work has to be 
done on the computational aspects and optimization of the recursive algorithm proposed, and 
an evaluation of its efficacy against a baseline brute-force approach. 
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